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In this paper I apply the idea of the “care diamond” (Razavi 2007), a conceptual framework used to 
understand how societal care is produced and provided by the state, market, family, and community, 
to the political and social economy of care in the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea). I argue that 
the institutional arrangements making up the care diamond in Korea have changed quite noticeably 
since the 1990s in response to the country’s evolving political, economic, and social contexts. Using 
the case of family-work harmonization policy reforms, I discuss the reconfiguration of the care 
diamond and what this means for gender. The paper is divided into three sections. Section 1 
describes the social policy regime in Korea and how this relates to the idea of the care diamond. 
Section 2 highlights key findings from our Time Use Survey analysis based on data from 1999 and 
2004,1 showing that despite increased state support for family care, women continue to take on a 
large share of unpaid care work within households, and that the total value of this work represents a 
significant percentage of Korea’s GDP. Finally, Section 3 provides an in-depth examination of the 
changing dynamics of the care diamond in Korea since the 1990s and considers implications for 
gender.  
 
1. Social Policy Regime  
Esping-Andersen’s familialistic welfare regime and Lewis’ male breadwinner model can both 
fruitfully be applied to Korea’s social policy regime (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Lewis, 1992). If we 
follow Esping-Andersen’s classification, Korean social policy regime, as in Japan and the Southern 
Mediterranean countries of Italy and Spain, can be categorized as “familialistic” – that is, a welfare 
regime “that assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the households” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 
45). Lewis’ framework, meanwhile, places it within the category of strong male breadwinner 
welfare regimes, aside Japan, Germany, and Ireland. Traditionally, Korean social policy regime 
devolved individual welfare and care responsibilities upon households (thus particularly impacting 
women) by providing almost no alternatives to family care. Unlike Social Democratic welfare states 
where public provisions of care services are available for children, the elderly, and the disabled, and 
unlike Liberal welfare states such as the US and Canada, where private-market based personal-care 
services are available to middle and higher income households, in Korea the absence of both public 
and private market sources of care has rendered the family the only viable site of personal care. As a 
result, women have performed much of the care work within the family in an un-commodified form.  
                                          
1 This section will be brief because a separate report on the Time Use Survey in Korea is available through UNRISD 
Political and Social Economy of Care Project (www.unrisd.org). 
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It is important to point out, however, that the fundamental logic of Korean social policy 
regime is both deeply gendered and filial. Welfare obligations are imposed not only on daughters 
but on sons and other male offspring as well. Hence, the notion of the male breadwinner family in a 
Korean context needs to be overlaid with the concept of familialism – intergenerational obligations 
and interdependencies that are gender and generation specific. Even so, men are able to escape 
doing care by facilitating care through the provision of material support and by delegating women 
to the task of caring. Korea’s dualistic employment system privileges male workers through 
employment protection and welfare benefits; it is, therefore, an institutional structure developed to 
sustain men’s indirect and women’s direct familial care obligations.  
This tight institutional interlock is changing, however. While maintaining a familialistic 
male breadwinner orientation, the Korean social policy regime, as in Japan, has been remodelling 
itself since the 1990s, from what may be considered an extensive familialism premised on women’s 
un-commodified care work to a modified familialism through the partial commodification of 
women’s care work.2 In short, the state’s preference for assigning maximum welfare obligations to 
individual households is being modified by attempts to lessen women’s care responsibilities through 
social care expansion. The process of shifting some of women’s care burdens, such as child and 
elderly care, out of the family has resulted in the commodification of some of women’s hitherto un-
commodified care work at home.  
In what follows, I outline Korean social policy regime using Esping-Andersen and Lewis’ 
welfare regime models, but I add a layer of complexity – late developer phenomenon – to explain 
the residualism and inconsistencies that so often confound the Korean welfare mix. I also illustrate 
key components of the Korean social policy regime and identify recent changes.  
 
Korean Social Policy Regime – Familialism, Male Breadwinner, and Late Developer Phenomenon 
Korea’s familialistic male breadwinner welfare regime is displayed in the state’s extensive reliance 
on the family for individual welfare and personal care – leading, as noted above, to women’s un-
commodified labour.3 A familialistic welfare regime is residual in that many (if not most) welfare 
obligations are assigned to the family.4 Until recently, Korean residualism took shape in minimal 
state support to the family, limited means-tested social welfare, and a strong bias in favour of male 
                                          
2 See Leitner (2003) for a discussion of different forms of familialism 
3 This is evocative of other familialistic welfare regimes such as Japan and Southern Mediterranean countries, where the 
state’s reliance on the family has led to a lack of family support programmes and personal social services. 
4 Unlike a liberal welfare regime, the residualism of a familialistic welfare regime stems from the state’s welfare 
responses directed to family failures rather than market failures. 
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breadwinner household arrangements supported by extensive employment protection legislation and 
stratified social insurance systems that favoured and protected full time male workers.  
The recent modification of the state’s approach to the family is an improvement but is a long 
way from overturning a fundamentally familialistic and patriarchal welfare orientation. Despite the 
increase in social spending since 1990, the proportion going to the family remains low. The 
percentage of total government expenditure on the family was 0.9 percent in 2005, a noticeable 
increase from 0.16 percent in 1990 and 0.33 percent in 2000 (OECD, 2008),5 6 but is still far from 
that of Japan, Sweden, and the UK, which were, respectively, 1.7 percent, 5.7 percent, and 6.6 
percent in 2000, and 2.8 percent, 5.7 percent, and 9.6 percent, respectively, in 2005 (OECD, 2008).  
From the perspective of the care diamond, the family continues to play a significant role in 
welfare provision in Korea. Until recently, the family provided the bulk of child and elderly care 
and was the main insurance against social risks. The family is still an important source of old age 
security for the elderly. The high, though declining, level of co-residency amongst the elderly and 
their adult children allows multi-generation family members to share housing and pool incomes and 
other material resources, and to exchange child and elderly care services. As shown in Table 1, 
despite the substantial increase in the proportion of single generation and single person elderly 
households since 1990, about 30 percent of all households with older people are three-generational. 
The importance of intergenerational economic support is underscored by the high level of material 
transfer from adult children (i.e. sons) to their elderly parents. Again, despite the evident decline 
since the mid-1990s, a little over half of those over the age of 60 claim that they receive material 
support from their children (Table 2). Furthermore, despite the sharp drop in the proportion of the 
elderly claiming financial support from their children as their main income source, from 72.4 
percent in 1981 to 44.3 percent in 1994, the Korean figure is considerably higher than countries 
such as the US and Denmark, where less than 1 percent of elderly people claim financial support 
from their children as their main income source (Kwon, 2001). Simply put, despite its declining 
importance, the family still performs an important role in old age security in Korea.  
 The family in Korea also plays a vital role in human capital investment. Despite the 
sizeable, and increasing, public investment in education and health, Korean families continue to 
                                          
5 The OECD defines social spending on family in terms of three types of public expenditures: 1) child-related cash 
transfers to families, including child allowances, income replacements for parental leave, income support for single 
parent families, and public child care support through payments to parents; 2) financing and delivery of services for 
families with children, including child care and early education, residential facilities for young people and family 
services, and centre-based facilities and home help services for families; and 3) financial support to families through tax 
system, including tax exemptions for families, child tax allowances, and child tax credits. 
6 Social expenditure on family and social welfare increased substantially after 2003, but no data are available. 
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spend a significant amount of money in both areas. For example, the public expenditure on 
education as percentage of GDP rose from 4.6 percent (8,524 billion Won) to 6.2 percent (48,258 
billion won) between 1990 and 2004; however, the private expenditure on education as a percentage 
of total household consumption for urban households also rose from 8.1 percent to 11.5 percent 
during the same period (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2004).7 The household 
educational spending increased to 12 percent in 2007, the highest since Korean National Statistics 
Office (KNSO) began compiling the data in 1984 (Korea Times, 2008). Much of this rise is 
attributed to spending on private tutoring. Similarly, the proportion of spending going to private, 
extracurricular education increased from 36.3 percent of the total household educational spending in 
1990 to 77.2 percent in 2004 (The Hankyorei, 2007). In the health care sector, the huge increase in 
the public share of the total health spending (35.7 percent in 1995 to 53.0 percent in 2005) is offset 
by a fairly high level household spending.8 In fact, because of the high co-payment rate, even with 
the rapid expansion of public health spending, the private share of health spending in Korea is 
amongst the highest in the OECD, after Greece (57 percent) and the US (55 percent) (OECD, 2007). 
In sum, while the public expenditure on social welfare and family support have increased in recent 
years, leading to a shift to a modified form of familialism, the family in Korea continues to play a 
major role in protecting individuals from social risks.  
 Late developer phenomenon is another important context of Korea’s social policy regime. 
The Korean welfare state’s developmental context makes its social policy regime hard to place 
within Esping-Andersen’s welfare typologies, as its emergent welfare system often makes the 
welfare mix inconsistent. For example, although the modern Korean social security system began 
with a strong emphasis on occupationally based social insurance and employment protection 
legislation – features that would make it an obvious candidate for Esping-Andersen’s conservative 
welfare regime – both systems changed quite markedly after 1987. The occupationally based social 
insurance systems – health, pension, employment, and workers’ compensation insurances – had 
been gradually expanding since the 1970s, but the pace of expansion accelerated exponentially after 
the 1987 political democratization. Notwithstanding the universalization of health insurance in 1989 
and pension insurance in 1999, other social insurance programmes were extended to most regular 
                                          
7 The figures for rural households declined from 10.5 percent to 4.1 percent between 1990 and 2004. This can be 
accounted for by the combination of increased state support for rural families and the changing demographic 
composition of rural families.  
8 During this time, the total health spending to GDP in Korea rose from 4.9 percent to 6.0 percent (OECD, 2007). 
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workers and employees.9 After 1998, the Employment Insurance coverage was extended to cover 
almost all waged workers in all workplaces, including most non-regular workers.10 Non-regular 
employees, the self-employed, and unpaid family workers were included in Workers’ Compensation 
insurance (or Occupational Accident insurance) coverage in 2000. Finally, in 2000, the National 
Basic Livelihood Security Programme (NBLS) decoupled the welfare entitlement from individual 
labour market attachment, making low income the sole criterion for receiving social assistance – a 
radical ideational departure from the previous social assistance system. Such a trajectory marks a 
shift from a conservative residual welfare model to a more universalistic welfare model. By the end 
of the 1990s, the main purpose of social insurance had shifted from its original aim, that of serving 
as a limited system of social risk pooling for core workers in key industries and professional groups, 
to that of a tool for social risk pooling and income redistribution. Thus, even if the structure of 
Korean welfare regime appears stubbornly unaltered, its functional purposes have changed quite 
significantly (for further discussion of changes in welfare regime structure and purposes, see Peng 
and Wong, 2008).  
At the same time, despite the welfare expansion, the Korean welfare mix exhibits liberal and 
informal features. First, the state’s total social spending remains low, despite the recent surge. We 
can arguably attribute this to Korea’s developmental status: although the Korean government has 
made significant progress in doubling its total social spending from 3 percent of GDP in 1990 to 6 
percent in 2000, it will take time to reach the OECD average. The new national blueprint for social 
and economic development, Vision 2030 (discussed later), proposes to raise Korea’s social spending 
to the OECD average of 21 percent by the year 2030 (Vision 2030). If successful, this would be an 
incredible developmental feat. Unlike many western welfare states Korea’s modern welfare state 
only began to take form after 1960, and more seriously after 1987. Given its relatively short 
development history and its stage of economic development, it is understandable that Korea’s social 
expenditure is low compared to other OECD countries.  
Second, and related to the first point, even with the expansion of most social insurances, an 
individual’s labour market status makes a difference in his/her social security. While this is true in 
                                          
9 Health care and pension insurance in Korea are universal, in that they are compulsory social insurance schemes. But 
despite their universal characteristics, there are status and gender-based differences. Individuals are insured through 
their employment or through their family/spouse’s insurance coverage; given women’s lower employment rate, many 
women are not directly covered, but are covered through spouses or fathers. The coverage rate for pensions is highly 
gendered because of women’s low employment rate and the newness of the national pension scheme.     
10 The 1998 reform expanded the coverage of EIP to all waged workers in all firms, except the following: workers over 
the age of 65 and new employees over the age of 60; part-time workers working less than 18 hours per week, or 80 
hours per month; government officials; employees covered by the Private School Teachers’ Pension Act; special postal 
workers. 
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other welfare regimes – in even the social democratic cluster of countries recent pension reforms 
have eroded the basic citizenship pillar – the issue of labour market status is more pronounced in 
Korea simply because of its large informal or non-standard employment sector11 and its relatively 
early stage of welfare state development. For example, even though Workers’ Compensation covers 
non-regular workers and the self-employed, the Employment Insurance coverage is limited to 
waged workers (i.e. formal sector employees). Over 30 percent of all workers in the Korean labour 
force are in the informal sector - self-employed, unpaid family workers, and own account holders – 
and the lack of Employment Insurance coverage makes them economically vulnerable (see Heintz 
2008 for a comparative perspective). Even in 2003, only about 7.2 million out of a total 14.4 million 
workers (50 percent) in Korea were covered by Employment Insurance, the other half being without 
insurance coverage largely because of their status as self-employed and/or unpaid family workers. 
The gender breakdown of Employment Insurance coverage shows that 57.1 percent of all male 
workers and 40 percent of all female workers had coverage in 2003 (Kim, et. al., 2004).12  
Thus, while formal social insurance programmes are in place, the large informal 
employment sector creates barriers to workers accessing these social insurances. In sum, Korean 
social policy regime exhibits characteristics of familialism and late developer phenomenon: its 
familialistic orientation causes gender bias and residualism, while its developmental status is 
evidenced in its high level of informality, early stage of welfare development, and its inconsistent 
and evolving welfare mix.  
 
Income Equality and Poverty Outcomes 
However, Korea fares rather well on orthodox measures of economic inequality and poverty. For 
example, although Gini figures for Korea vary depending on the data sources,13 there is general 
agreement that income inequality declined after 1960 and remained relatively low until the late 
1990s. The World Income Inequality Database (WIID) calculations of Gini figures for Korea show 
a range of 0.29 to 0.42 for 1965, 0.30 to 0.36 for 1970; 0.36 to 0.41 for 1980; 0.32 to 0.33 for 1990; 
                                          
11 I use non-standard employment sector to refer to the sectors of employment such as self-employed, own account 
holders, and unpaid family workers. This is different from non-regular employment sector, which is part of the salary 
and wage employment but is not full time employment.  
12 These features make the Korean welfare regime somewhat akin to Latin American welfare regimes in having a strong 
feature of informality (Barrientos, 2004).Unlike Latin American welfare regimes (e.g. Mexico), where informal sector 
workers are often excluded from health and pension insurance, Korean health and pension insurance is universal, and 
the Korean government has made efforts to broaden other social insurance schemes to include informal sector workers.  
13 Data on income equality in Korea are highly variable because of the incompleteness of many household income 
surveys. Many official and non-official data are based on household incomes of employees, or urban working 
population, and may over-estimate the level of income equality. WIID calculations vary widely because they try to use 
different household income data.  
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and 0.37 to 0.43 for 1998 (WIID, 2006). The Korea National Statistics Office’s calculations based 
on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey shows Gini increasing from 0.31 in January 1996 to 
0.33 in January 1999, and declining to 0.32 in April 2000. Kang’s summary of historical trends of 
Korea’s income distributions (Table 3) shows a continuing reduction in income inequality from the 
1960s to the late 1990s, then rising after the 1997 Asian economic crisis (Kang, 2001).  
The level of poverty in Korea varies depending on the data source used, but has been low 
compared to other developing and developed countries. For example, the proportion of population 
living below $2 per day in Korea was less than 2 percent in 2005 (WDI, 2006). The estimates for 
population living in the poverty range from the KNSO estimate of 5.9 percent in January 1996, 8.5 
percent in January 1999, and 4.6 in April 2000 (Park), to Yoo and Kim’s (2003) estimate of 17 
percent.14 OECD calculation of total household poverty rate using 40 percent of median income 
shows fluctuation in poverty rate from 5.0 percent in 1991 to 4.6 percent in 1996 and then up to 8.1 
percent in 2000, with elderly, single person, and female-headed household poverty rates being much 
higher than the average, at 38.8 percent, 16.4 percent and 14.6 percent in 2000, respectively (OECD, 
2007b). Park’s (2002) in-depth analysis of poverty in Korea suggests the poverty rate in Korea 
declined between 1982 (20.4 percent) and 1996 (7.4 percent). It rose again after 1997, reaching 15.4 
percent in 1999, then fell to 8.4 percent in 2000. Four main causes of poverty in Korea, according to 
Park are: lack of capacity to work due to age (either too old or too young), illness, disability, and not 
having a father in the family.  
The apparent income equality in Korea, however, needs to be taken with caution. First, it is 
clear that the positive socio-economic outcome is not a result of effective income redistribution 
through social policy, but an outcome of a combination of long-term economic growth and the type 
of political economic institutional arrangement that, at least until recently, provided male 
breadwinners with basic employment security and family wages. Indeed, as pointed out by Yoo et 
al., the differences between disposable income equality and market income equality in Korea is 
remarkably low, merely 4.5 percent in 2000, as compared to the OECD average of 41.65 percent in 
1986 (Yoo et al., 2004). This implies that the Korean welfare state plays a marginal role in income 
equalization. Income equalization has been achieved through the state’s effective management of 
economic development that has led to sustained economic growth, a secure employment system, 
and a low wage gap amongst male workers, at least until very recently. Korea’s protective 
                                          
14 Yoo and Kim’s calculation is based on total household poverty rate at 50 percent of median income. 
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employment and labour market policies were, therefore, important factors behind low levels of 
poverty and income disparity. 
Second, inequality and poverty measures are based on aggregate income at the household 
level, thereby obscuring gender differences in income and the extent of women’s poverty. As 
illustrated by OECD calculations, the poverty rate amongst female-headed households in 2000 was 
nearly twice that of the total household figure (OECD, 2007b). Korea studies confirm that single 
mother families are much more likely to live in poverty than are two parent families or single father 
families (MOGEM, 2005; Park, 1998). The main reason is the ongoing labour market gender 
inequality. Despite the decline since the 1990s, gender wage gap was still about 40 percent in 2006 
(Ministry of Labour, 2008).15  
 
Re-articulation of Labour Market and Social Welfare Policies 
A key feature of Korean labour market policies since the 1960s has been strong employment 
protection. The labour law, until the recent reforms, restricted employers from hiring non-regular 
workers and laying-off employees. In effect, as Woo (2007) points out, without having the kind of 
lifetime employment system found in countries like Japan, Korean labour law provided a de facto 
lifetime employment for male workers in standard full-time employment. The strong employment 
protection component of Korean labour law was the political trade off for its highly repressive and 
anti-labour side that denied labour the right to form independent unions and engage in political 
activities (Woo, 2007). This situation has changed since the 1990s with increased political rights for 
labour, on the one hand; and the loosening of employment protection, on the other. The process of 
labour market deregulation intensified after the aforementioned 1997 Asian economic crisis, when 
the government, following IMF economic bailout conditions, overhauled the labour market. 
Subsequently, the employment protection capacity of the labour law weakened significantly. The 
sharp rise in income inequality and poverty after the economic crisis was the combination of worker 
layoffs and forced retirements, and the subsequent replacement of regular employment with non-
regular employment.16 
                                          
15 Women’s wage, working hours, and turnover rate relative to men in 1995 and 2003 were as follows: Wage – 59.9 
percent (1995); 64.2 percent (2003); Working hours – 97.2 percent (1995); 97.0 percent (2003); Turnover rate – 130.0 
percent (1995); 138.1 percent (2003) 
(Ministry of Labor, Monthly Wage Statistics Report, 2008) 
16 On the nature of non-regular employment in Korea, see Peng and Mahon (2007, draft); Grub, Lee and Tergeist (2007); 
Ahn (2006); Jung and Cheon (2006).  
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It is important to point out that the income inequality outcome of the post-1997 labour 
market restructuring was by no means gender neutral. To be sure, women were significantly more 
adversely affected. The proportion of women in regular standard employment (as a percentage of all 
economically active women) declined from 25.5 percent to 19.1 percent between 1995 and 2000, 
while that of non-regular standard employment (temporary and daily employment) rose from 34.0 
percent to 42.4 percent during the same period, suggesting that many women were laid off and/or 
withdrew from full-time work and opted for temporary and daily employment (KWDI, 2008). Lee 
and Cho (2005) claim that many women dropped out of the labour market after 1997 because they 
were frustrated by employers’ discriminatory behaviour. Their claim is supported by Lee et al.’s 
survey of employer behaviour in 2000 which found that the majority of employers held either 
gender stereotypical attitudes and/or aversion towards hiring women because of the possibility of 
career interruption due to marriage and maternity (Lee et al., 2001). Cho (1999) also notes a 
significantly higher rate of involuntary unemployment among women as compared to men in 1998, 
suggesting that women workers were most likely the first to be let go after the economic crisis.  
By 2003, the issue of income inequality was a central public policy issue in Korea. As a 
result, economic and social policies were tightly interwoven. This is evident in the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration’s (2003-2008) policy strategy, Vision 2030, introduced in 2006. As a national 
blueprint for Korean government’s long-term social and economic development strategy, Vision 
2030 reframes the principle of Korean national development from “economy first; welfare later” to 
“economic growth with welfare.” The Vision’s overarching goals of raising per capita income to 
US$49,000 (from the 2006 level of US$14,000) and the total social expenditure to 21 percent of 
GDP (from the 2007 level of 8.6 percent) by 2030 is premised on the idea of increased public 
investment in human and social capital and the creation of positive returns between economic 
growth and social welfare development. The government’s efforts to increase business 
competitiveness and labour market flexibility are counterbalanced by an expanded social security 
and social welfare system; at the same time, social welfare expansion (particularly in child and 
elderly care) is seen as the “growth engine” for economic development (Lee, 2007).17  
 
Key Components of the Korean Social Policy Regime and Recent Reforms 
Figure 1 illustrates the key components of the Korean social policy regime, and Table 4 provides 
detailed information about the major social security programmes. As illustrated above, the recent 
                                          
17Also interview with Lee Sook Jin, KIHASA, 18 December 2007. 
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reforms have led to a universalization of social insurance and expansion of public assistance and 
social welfare. The Korean social security system appears to be delivering a reasonably wide range 
of income support and social services programmes, despite the low level of total public social 
expenditure. There is some indication of extensive population coverage for key social policy 
programmes, such as health care and education. The health and social welfare outcomes for Korea 
are also quite positive. For example, the population health data show increasing life expectancy at 
birth, at 75 years for males and 82 for females in 2006, a noticeable jump from the 1990 figures of 
68 and 76 years, respectively; a low infant mortality rate (5/1,000 live births, in 2006); and 
generally positive health status compared to other OECD countries (WHO, 2008). On the 
educational front, school enrolment rates amongst Korean children and youth are extremely high. 
Moreover, student performance on combined reading, scientific, and mathematical literacy scales 
show Korean students performing significantly better than other OECD countries (OECD, 2006).  
In sum, the Korean social welfare regime has made significant strides over the last several 
decades through expansion and redesign. Since 1990, the social security system has expanded by: 1) 
universalizing key social insurance schemes – health and pension; 2) extending insurance coverage 
in areas such as workers’ compensation and employment insurance; and 3) adding new social 
insurance schemes, for example, Elderly Care Insurance in July 2008. Social assistance programmes, 
such as the National Basic Livelihood Support, have been restructured by dropping the labour 
market attachment criterion for social assistance eligibility. Finally, the social care sector has been 
extended through the expansion of child and elderly care, as will be discussed in Section 3. 
 
Section 2:  Significance of Unpaid Care within the Household to Total Care Provisioning  
We analyzed the Time Use Survey data from 1999 and 2004 (the only two data sets currently 
available) to determine the magnitude of unpaid care work carried out within the household, how 
this unpaid care work is distributed between men and women, and whether there has been any 
change in its size and nature over time in Korea. In this section, I summarize our key findings.  
Our analysis shows that by 2004, the expansion in social welfare and social care, particularly 
child care (discussed in Section 3), had not created much change in the amount of unpaid care work 
undertaken by women in the household or in the distribution of unpaid care work between men and 
women. On the whole, men spent proportionally more (but not much more) time on paid 
employment and significantly less time on unpaid care work, than women in both 1999 and 2004. 
Women spent a little less time on paid employment and significantly more time on unpaid care work. 
When added together, men spent on average 19 percent and 18 percent of a day on paid employment 
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in 1999 and 2004, respectively, while women spent 12 percent and 11 percent, respectively. The 
proportion of time men spent on housekeeping and person-care were 2 percent and 3 percent in 
1999 and 2004, as compared to women at 14 percent and 13 percent, respectively. In total, men 
spent 21 percent of their time on paid and unpaid work in both years, while women spent 27 percent 
and 24 percent, respectively. Put another way, women spent more than 5 times the amount of time 
that men spent on unpaid care work, while at the same time spending a little over 60 percent of the 
time men spent on paid work. In sum, women not only took on more unpaid care work than men, 
but the overall proportion of time women spent on work (paid and unpaid) was higher than men’s. 
A closer examination of the time use shows that in the years surveyed, married women bore 
the largest burden of unpaid care work in Korea. For example, married women’s mean participation 
time and participation rate in housekeeping work were significantly higher when compared to 
married men and single women in both years (Table 5). It seems that much of married women’s 
unpaid care work in Korea is concentrated in childcare (Table 6).18 In another calculation, we found 
that while women’s unpaid care work seemed to have declined slightly in 2004 for those who were 
employed, whether employed or not, women took on a disproportionately larger burden of unpaid 
care work than men (Ahn, 2008). These figures suggest, first, that the gender division of labour 
remained relatively unchanged between 1999 and 2004, and second, that regardless of their 
employment status, women, particularly married women, in Korea take on a disproportionately 
large share of unpaid care work both in terms of the amount of time they spend and in their 
participation rate. The significance of women’s unpaid care work to the national economy cannot be 
under-estimated. Our calculations of the value of unpaid care work in 2004 as a percentage of the 
GDP show that it could reach as high as 29 percent of the GDP, with women contributing 24 
percent and men contributing 5 to 6 percent.  
In sum, the Time Use Survey data show no evidence of women’s share of unpaid care work 
within the households being lessened, or changes in gender division of labour between 1999 and 
2004. This may be accounted for by the timing of social care expansion and by time lag. Since some 
of the key areas of social care expansion, such as childcare services and benefits, happened after 
2004, our current Time Use Survey analysis may not be the best indicator of policy impacts on 
household care distribution. Indeed, as Vision 2030 becomes more fully implemented, we may see 
                                          
18 The demand for elderly care remains low, largely because the proportion of the elderly population in Korea is lower 
(about 8 percent in 2004) than in most OECD countries. This will likely change as the population is rapidly aging – a 
result of the low fertility rate. 
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some real decline in the proportion of women’s unpaid care work within the households, however, it 
is too early even to hazard a guess.  
 
Section 3: The Care Diamond 
As shown in Figure 2 below, since the 1990s the Korean state has taken on a larger role in 
regulating, providing, and financing social care services, and with the implementation of Vision 
2030, its participation in social welfare and care will expand farther. The market’s role in supplying 
and maintaining steady and secure employment for male breadwinners has weakened as a result of 
labour market reforms; as a result, it has repositioned itself as a supplier of social and care services, 
and a source of new, albeit precarious, service sector employment. Since a significant portion of this 
new service sector industry relates to care – for children and elderly – the market will likely take on 
an increasing role within the care diamond. The family still remains an important site of social 
welfare and care, but has been relieved of some of its care and welfare responsibilities with the 
expanded participation of state and market in social welfare. Finally, there is an expectation that 
NGOs and voluntary organizations will play a larger part in providing social welfare and social care. 
In sum, the configuration of the Korean care diamond has shifted from a strong emphasis on the 
family (in providing care) and the market (in providing stable industrial employment) to a more 
balanced redistribution of care and welfare provision.  
In this section, I will outline the changes in the care diamond since the 1990s and discuss 
how these changes have come about. I argue that the expansion of social welfare and social care in 
Korea is a product of multiple and often conflicting objectives held by multiple actors. Next, 
drawing on the 2004 Time Use Survey data, I note that the commodification of women’s unpaid 
care work through the socialization of care in Korea has not led to greater gender equality. Finally, I 
use the case of recent childcare policy reforms to illustrate how conflicting objectives have resulted 
in uneven outcomes. 
 
Changing Dimensions of the Care Diamond: The State - A Steady Expansion 
As noted above, the size of the state sphere has expanded noticeably. The state has assumed (and 
promises to continue to assume) more welfare responsibilities by legislating, financing, and directly 
providing welfare, particularly child and elderly care, through the public, market, and community 
sectors. For example, policies related to Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) have 
undergone some important revisions since 1990, resulting in not only the expansion of the ECCE 
and the reaffirmation of state commitment to equalize ECCE opportunity for all children, but also in 
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more integration between early childhood education (a jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, 
Science, and Technology) and early childhood care (a jurisdiction of Ministry of Gender Equality 
and Family - MOGEF, now Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs).19  
Legislation concerning early childhood education in Korea began in 1982 with the Early 
Childhood Education Promotion Act, which led to a rapid growth in public and private 
kindergartens. The number of kindergartens increased from 2,958 (1,922 public; 1,036 private) in 
1981 to 8,354 (4,602 public; 3,751 private) in 1990, and reached a peak in 1997 with a total of 9,005 
(4,419 public; 4,583, private).20 The kindergarten curriculum was standardized at the national level 
by the Education Law in 1992.  
Paralleling the development in early childhood education is childcare legislation, introduced 
in 1991 under the Child Care Act. This legislation facilitated the development of both public and 
private childcare centres. The total number of childcare centres nearly doubled, from 1,919 (360 
public; 39 private; and 1,520 home and workplace childcare) in 1990 to 3,690 (503 public; 1,237 
private; 1,950 home and workplace childcare) in 1991.21 Similarly, the number of children enrolled 
in childcare centres jumped from 48,000 (25,000 public; 1,500 private; 21,500 home and workplace 
daycares) in 1990, to 89,441 (37,017 public; 36,099 private; and 16,325 home and workplace 
daycares) in 1991 (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2007).22 After this, the number of 
childcare centres and the number of children enrolled in these centres increased rapidly. By 2007, 
the total number of children enrolled in childcare centres had reached 1,062,415, over 22-fold 
increase since 1990; while the total number of childcare centres increased to 29,823, an increase of 
over 15-fold, during the same period (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2007).  
                                          
19 Early childhood education (ECE) in Korea is primarily in the form of kindergartens and hakwons (private educational 
institutions specializing in English, music, arts, martial arts, etc..) and caters to infants aged 3 to 5 years; early childcare 
(ECC) appears mainly as institutional and home-based childcare, and caters to children aged 0 to 5 years. The main 
objective of ECE is education and school preparation, while ECC’s is care, though since the 1990s, the two objectives 
have began to merge as many ECE and ECC institutions are providing both education and care. A current policy issue in 
Korea is the institutionalization of these two separate and often private systems into a public education system. 
20 There has been a small decline in the number of kindergartens and children enrolled in them since 1997, partly 
because of the decline in the total number of children and partly because of the number of children in childcare centres. 
21 Such a huge increase in the number of child care centres may be hard to believe, but is indeed the case. Perhaps many 
private child care arrangements were already in place, but were not registered through the government certification and 
licensing system. The formalization of the national childcare legislation may have prompted the registration of private 
child care centres in national registry. 
22 Home day care is a home-based day care or playroom often provided by child minders in their own homes with small 
number of children as an alternative to large institutional childcare. Home childcare is also mandated to care only 
children two years and under. Workplace day care is often institutional based day care provided by employers for 
children of employees, located in the workplace or in company housing compounds. 
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Private childcare centres do not necessarily mean private for-profit business.23 In fact, a 
significant proportion of “private” childcare centres are run by not-for-profit organizations, such as 
religious-based NGOs and other registered non-profit corporations. Currently, of all childcare 
centres, only 5.6 percent (1,670 out of 29,823) are truly public, the rest being private for-profit and 
non-profit centres. In terms of the number of children enrolled in childcare centres, only 11 percent 
of all children enrolled (117,126 out of 1,062,415) are in public childcare centres. The 
distinguishing feature of the public childcare centres is that they are considered pure public 
institutions. Childcare workers in public childcare centres are thus considered public servants.  
Both public and private childcare centres are regulated by the Child Care Act. They are 
government inspected, and must report to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (this 
jurisdiction was moved to Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs in 2009) to receive 
government subsidies. Childcare fees in Korea, for both private and public childcare centres, are 
regulated and standardized. Parents can choose either public or private childcare centre and pay pre-
set childcare fee according to their income levels. The government then reimburses childcare centres 
for the cost of childcare on a per capita basis. Many parents prefer to send their children to public 
childcare centres, not because of the cost differential, but because they believe these centres provide 
better quality childcare. In short, the Korean government regulates and delivers childcare services 
either directly through public childcare centres or by contracting out services through private 
childcare centres. 
State policies concerning ECCE changed decisively after 1997, when the Presidential 
Commission on Education Reform introduced A Plan for Educational Reform to Establish a New 
Education System. The Plan proposed the establishment of a new public pre-school system for 
children aged 3 to 5 that will integrate early childhood education and early childcare. Pointing out 
that early childhood education is “the best educational investment” a country can make in “building 
a foundation of holistic development of human beings,” the Presidential Commission saw the 
integration of early childhood education and child care as a way to lessen families’ financial 
burdens and to raise women’s social and economic participation (Presidential Commission on 
Education Reform, 1997, cited in Na and Moon, 2003). The proposal also emphasized creating a 
level playing field by giving priority to children from disadvantaged and low-income families to 
access ECCE programmes, and to ensure at least one-year free pre-school education for all 5-year 
                                          
23 The childcare centres referred to here are those falling under the Child Care Act, which falls within the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare, not early child education institutions such as kindergartens and play groups. 
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olds. This was followed by a plan to achieve a 100 percent pre-school enrolment rate for 5-year olds 
by 2005 (UNESCO, 2006).  
Unfortunately, the government was not able to achieve the target figure due to a combination 
of fiscal constraints and resistance from small-scale care service providers, hakwons, and the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (UNESCO, 2003 a, b). According to the OECD database, the 
enrolment rate of children under the age of 3 in childcare centres was 19.9 percent, and the 
combined enrolment rate of children in childcare centres and pre-schools was 59.5 percent, 66.4 
percent, and 88.7 percent for 3, 4, and 5 year-olds, respectively in 2004 (OECD, Family and 
Education Database).24  
The revisions of the Early Childhood Education Act in 2004 and Child Care Act in 2005 
(renamed the Second Scheme for National Childcare Support Policy, or Saeromaji 2010, in 2006) 
led to the establishment of various interministerial and national-local ECCE related committees, 
such as Childcare Policy Mediation Commissions (Office of the Prime Minister), Central Childcare 
Policy Commission (MOGEF), and Regional Childcare Policy Commission (Seoul, metropolitan 
cities, Do, city/gun/gu) to develop more effective ECCE programmes. The MOGEF also took over 
the coordination of the implementation of national childcare policy. Both the national and regional 
governments assumed more responsibilities for ECCE, including up-to-date childcare related 
funding and increased certification requirements for ECE teachers, childcare staff, and facilities. 
The target for nation-wide free education for all 5-year-olds was reset to 2010. Notwithstanding the 
nation-wide free education for all 5-year olds, the Korean government estimates a significant 
increase in children’s enrolment rate in ECCE institutions over the next 15 years as a result of 
public investment (Table 7). National government budgets for ECE and childcare have increased 
markedly, with ECE budgets more than doubling, from 356 billion Won in 2002 to 886 billion Won 
in 2006, and childcare nearly quintupling, from 435 billion to 2,038 billion, in 2002 and 2006, 
respectively (see Table 8 for national budget for ECCE programmes between 2005 and 2006). The 
total national budget for ECCE programmes thus increased from 0.12 percent to 0.349 percent of 
GDP.  
The increase in state support for childcare is reflected in a decline in the ratio of parents’ 
out-of-pocket payments and an increase in the number of families receiving financial assistance. For 
example, the ratio of parents’ out-of-pocket payment in childcare declined to 46 percent of total 
childcare cost in 2007 (Choi, 2008). As shown in Tables 9 and 10, the government introduced 
                                          
24 Differences between the OECD calculation and the Korean calculation are illustrated in Table 7. 
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financial support for childcare and kindergarten on a sliding scale based on household income, in 
addition to the basic subsidy for children aged 0 to 2 years. A number of tax benefit programmes 
have been introduced to help families with pre-school children, including: 1) an annual income tax 
deduction of up to 1-million Won per child for families with children under 6 years; 2) a deduction 
of 2.5 million Won from annual taxable income for families with two or more children under 20 
years of age; 3) an annual income tax deduction of up to 2 million Won for education fees for 
families with children 3-5 years old attending kindergarten and childcare facilities; 4) an annual 
income tax deduction for medical expenses for children in amounts exceeding 3 percent of income; 
and 5) a tax exemption for up to 100,000 Won per month of childbirth and childcare allowances 
paid by employers (Korea Institute of Child Care and Education, 2008).  
The renewed public support for childcare is evident in the increase in the proportion of 
children receiving childcare subsidies. The 2005 and 2006 data show that 43.4 percent and 50.7 
percent of children between the ages of 0 and 5 enrolled in childcare centres received childcare 
subsidies, respectively (Korean Educational Development Institute, 2008). The government 
promises to extend the childcare allowance to 80 percent of all families with children under the age 
of 5 by 2010 (Korea.net, 2006b). To meet the growing childcare needs, 2.6 billion Won were 
allotted in 2007 to provide low-cost babysitting services and nighttime babysitting services for 
families with children between the ages of 3 and 12 months (Chosun Daily, 2007).25 
In addition to childcare, a number of work-family harmonization policy reforms have been 
introduced since 2000. For example, the 2001 Maternity Protection Act (a reform of maternity and 
parental leave legislations within the Labour Standard Act, Equal Employment Act, and 
Employment Insurance Act) extended paid maternity leave from 60 to 90 days (at 100 percent wage 
replacement), and introduced financial support for parents taking one-year parental leave.26 In 2005 
the maternity leave legislation was revised again, this time, shifted the financial burden of wage 
replacement from the employer to the state and social insurance.27 The government set aside 
approximately 10 billion Won (US$10 million) in 2007 and 90 billion Won (US$90 million) in 
2008, targeting small and medium size companies (Korea Net, 2005). To encourage parents to take 
parental leave, a monthly flat-rate wage replacement of 300,000 Won (or approx. $250 US, in 2003) 
                                          
25 Choi (2008) argues that although the Kim Dae-jung government emphasized gender equality by improving women’s 
right to work, it was under the Roh Moo-hyun administration that more concrete work-family reconciliation policies 
began to be implemented.  
26 Although fathers are encouraged to take parental leave, Korea has yet to introduce a formal “daddy leave” policy. 
Parental leave systems are transferable between the two parents. 
27 The change came as a result of high non-compliance rates by employers, particularly those in small firms, and of 
employer discrimination against hiring women. Employers’ resistance stemmed from their legal obligation to pay 60 of 
the 90 days of wage replacement during maternity leave (Chosun Ilbo, 2003).  
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per month was added to the remaining 9 months of parental leave in 2004. This rate was 
subsequently raised to 400,000 Won ($400 US) in 2006 and 500,000 Won ($500) in 2007. The 
wage replacement of 300,000 Won in 2003 came to about 10 percent of the average urban 
household income.28 In the latest round of reforms in 2006, the government extended the period of 
parental leave from 1 to 3 years for public servants (Korea Net, 2006). Other programmes such as 
“no over-time on the 6th of every month” campaign29 and “daddy quota” scheme in parental leave 
have been also introduced since 2006 to ensure a more equitable sharing of care responsibility 
between men and women (Choi, 2008).30 
On the employment front, some attempts have been made to recast the male breadwinner 
model into a dual earner model. The comprehensive women’s workforce development plan, 2006-
2010, introduced by MOGEF in 2006, for example, seeks to activate women’s employment and to 
support their human capital development through legislative reforms, such as the Equal 
Employment Act and legislation to support enterprises owned by women. Affirmative Action for 
women in the labour market was introduced in March 2006, specifically aiming to eliminate 
discrimination against women in hiring and promotion. It is currently applied to workplaces with 
500 employees and more on a full-time basis (Choi, 2008). Self-Reliance Support Programmes were 
instituted within the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) Programme to help recipients of 
NBLS income support, particularly lone mothers, achieve paid employment. In addition to free 
childcare, women are given job training, support for job placement and job finding, vocational 
training, and support for business start-ups. Data show that in addition to NBLS income support 
(provided to over 54 percent of lone-mother and over 50 percent of lone-father families), the 
government increased its budget for other programmes related to single parent families by about 50 
percent between 2005 and 2006. 
The latest expansion of the state role in social welfare in Korea was the introduction of 
Elderly Care Insurance in July 2008. It covers the long-term care needs of people over the age of 65, 
and all age-related long-term care services to people under the age of 65 in both domiciliary and 
institutional settings. The insurance fee of 4.7 percent of wage is added onto the existing health 
insurance contribution. Elderly Care Insurance provides care to approximately 3.5 percent of all 
elderly; it will gradually expand its provision to two thirds of all seniors (National Welfare Centre, 
                                          
28 In 2003, the average nominal monthly income for urban salaried and wage earners’ households with two or more 
people was 2,940,000 Won (KNSO, 2004). 
29 “Six” sounds very similar to pronunciation of “raising (children)” or “taking care of (children)” in Korean.  
30  Daddy quota is a parental leave policy specifically targeted to fathers, and is not transferable to mothers. It was 
designed to encourage fathers to take time off work to care for their young children. 
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2006). In sum, the recent trajectory of social welfare reforms in Korea – ECCE, family-work 
harmonization, and elderly care – indicates an expansion of the state role in financing and regulating 
social welfare and care. 
 
Changing Dimensions of the Care Diamond: The Market - Repositioning within the Care Diamond 
The highly regulated market in Korea has been repositioning itself. Once the source of stable 
employment for male breadwinners, it is becoming the supplier of new social and care services and 
a source of service sector employment for women. This change stems from a combination of post-
economic crisis labour market restructuring and active welfare policy reforms introduced in synch 
with family-work harmonization and social care policies.  
One of the most dramatic outcomes of the post-economic crisis labour market restructuring 
in Korea was the relaxation of the employment protection that had, on the one hand, sustained the 
dual labour market; but on the other, ensured employment security and a family wage for male 
breadwinners.31 The relaxation of employment protection thus implies the possibility of breaking 
down the dual labour market structure that discriminates against women and other workers outside 
the core labour force. At the same time, it may undermine the most important form of social security 
for Korean families, namely, the employment security of male breadwinners. A steady push towards 
labour market flexibilization actually began in the 1990s, with the unsuccessful labour legislation 
reform of 1996 by the conservative Kim Young-Sam government (1992-1997) (ICFTU, 1997). The 
Labour Standard Act amendment of 1998 was therefore a follow-up to a process that was already 
established before the Asian economic crisis.  
The 1998 amendment nearly did away with the de facto lifetime employment system in 
exchange for increased political rights for labour and the expansion of social security and social 
welfare. It allowed “urgent managerial need” as a justifiable reason for layoff, it permitted 
employers to hire more non-standard workers, and it legalized temporary dispatch work through 
temporary employment agencies. The outcome of labour market flexibilization was the undermining 
of employment security, without breaking down the dual labour market. Indeed, it may have 
deepened the dual labour market structure by shrinking the core labour market, and throwing an 
                                          
31 By “dual labour market,” I mean a structural bifurcation of the labour market into “core” and “periphery,” with the 
core consisting of regular, full-time employment, often accompanied by union representation, family wages, and 
generous company welfare, and the periphery consisting of non-regular and informal employment, often characterized 
by the lack of union representation, lower wages, precarious working conditions, limited social insurance coverage, and 
limited access to company welfare benefits. In addition to the core-periphery and regular-non-regular employment 
divide, significant differences in wage and employment conditions exist between large and small-and-medium 
enterprises. In Korea, the peripheral labour market tends to be made up of small and medium size companies and 
informal sectors where the majority of women workers are found. 
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even greater proportion of workers to the periphery. The proportion of standard (regular) workers as 
percentage of all waged workers declined from 56.8 percent in 1996 to 47.9 percent in 2000, 
recovering slightly to 52.8 percent in 2008 (KLI, 2006). As illustrated in Table 11, in 2005 only 
25.0 percent of female urban employment and 40.2 percent of male urban employment in Korea 
could be considered “core” employment.  
To compensate for the breakdown of the employment protection system, the government 
introduced a number of active welfare programmes, which included the expansion of social 
insurance, social welfare, and employment and job-focused support programmes (Korea, 2000). As 
discussed earlier, both the Employment Insurance and Workers Compensation Insurance were 
extended to workers in small and medium size companies, and later to non-standard workers such as 
contract and part-time workers. In the case of Workers Compensation Insurance, the coverage was 
extended to self-employed and family workers as well. The national pension system was extended 
to the urban self-employed in 1999, the last remaining group of people without a pension scheme, 
broadening coverage to over 9 million new members and universalizing the system.32  
As the result of social security expansion the percentage of social spending to GDP rose 
from 3 percent to 9 percent between 1995 and 1999. The public expenditure for unemployment 
(unemployment benefits, not total employment support) rose by nearly 100-fold, from 10.46 billion 
Won in 1996 to 1,030.3 billion Won in 2003, while the expenditure on the active labour market (job 
creation, employment support, etc.) increased by about 30-fold, from 118.8 billion Won in 1996 to 
3,346.8 billion in 1999, before declining to 1,141.1 billion Won in 2003 (OECD, 2008).  
The government has invested a significant amount of money in childcare as discussed above. 
Most childcare services are provided by (and are expected to be provided by) private for-profit and 
non-profit sector providers. Similarly, the Elderly Care Insurance services are expected to be 
provided primarily by the market and community sectors, through private for-profit, non-profit, and 
community-based voluntary organizations.33 The expansion of state welfare in Korea is therefore 
hardly market challenging; to be sure, the new welfare mix is positively market enhancing. Rather 
                                          
32 Although attempts have been made to universalize social insurance, some programmes are far from universal; while 
systems have been put in place, it will take time to achieve maturity. For example, the Korean Institute of Health and 
Social Affairs’ (KIHASA) calculation of National Pension individual beneficiaries among 65+ population (not including 
widows’ pensions) shows 37.8 percent beneficiary coverage for men and 4.5 percent for women in 2007. It is estimated 
that these proportions will increase to 66.2 percent for men and 14.1 percent for women by 2020, and 84.5 percent for 
men and 25.0 percent for women by 2030. The main reason for the significantly lower NP beneficiary rate for women is 
the low pension enrolment rate amongst women until recently and the mandatory minimum 25-year maturity for pension 
benefits (KIHASA, 2007, calculation by Suk-Myung Yun, Director of Pension Research Department, KIHASA, and 
interview with Suk-Myung Yung, Dec. 17, 2007).  
33 Interview with Se-Kyong Park and Hyekyu Kang, KIHASA, 17 December 2007.  
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than taking over the market function, social welfare policies under both Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun governments have sought to facilitate and enhance the market role by investing in social 
welfare and care services that are largely delivered through the market. So much so that in response 
to concerns about low economic growth rate (about 4 percent per year since 2002!), low fertility and 
rapid ageing, and growing labour shortage, the Roh Moo-hyun government has been re-framing its 
social welfare expansion policies not only as family-friendly social policies, but as family-friendly 
economic policies, in essence, selling social services as potential “growth engines” for the new 
economy (Lee, 2008).34  
 
Changing Dimensions of the Care Diamond: Family - Reduced Care Burden; Increased Work 
Expectation 
Although yet to be reflected in the 2004 Time Use Survey, the increase in the state support and 
commitment to social welfare and social care promises to relieve the family (i.e. women) of some of 
the care burden. This promise is, however, offset by an increased pressure on women to work. The 
breakdown of the traditional male breadwinner household model resulting from the erosion of 
employment security for men has created multiple pressures on the family and women.  
First, the decline in family income immediately after 1997 added pressure to women to go 
out and work. For example, the average monthly income for urban wage earners’ households 
dropped by about 7 percent, from 2,287,300 Won (about US $2,287) in 1997 to 2,133,100 Won (US 
$2,133) in 1998. Even with the improved situation after 2000, norms of dual income households and 
expectations of women’s life-long employment have taken hold (Na and Moon, 2004). The 
percentage of people believing that women devote themselves only to housekeeping declined from 
21.1 percent in 1991 to 8.1 percent in 2002. Those who believed that women should work only until 
they marry fell from 20.2 percent to 5.2 percent between 1991 and 2002; while those who believe 
that women should work throughout their lives increased from 13.7 percent to 35.4 percent (KNSO, 
2002). A recent survey by Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) showed that over 
80 percent of young men preferred to marry working women.35 
Second, the employment insecurity for both men and women has created a climate of 
insecurity for young people. Studies suggest that the shift in public attitudes towards life-long 
employment has led to low fertility. A survey by the Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and 
                                          
34 Also interviews with Hyekyung Lee, Chairperson, Presidential Commission on Social Inclusion, 18 December 2007, 
and Bong Joo Lee, Professor, Seoul National University, 19 December 2007. 
35 Interview with Seung-Ah Hong, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 14 December 2007. 
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Population Policy found that the most important reasons for young people deferring marriage – the 
main cause of fertility decline – were housing shortage and employment insecurity.36 The total 
crude marriage rate in Korea declined from 388.6 per 1,000 in 1997 to 304.9 per 1,000 in 2003. 
During the same time, the marriage rate for first-time marriage fell from 345.6 to 253.3 for men and 
343.2 to 247.6 for women. The average age at first marriage for men increased from 28.6 years in 
1997 to 31.1 in 2007, while that of women rose from 25.7 to 28.1 (KNSO, 2008). 
The pressure on women to work is, however, complicated by pervasive discrimination 
against women in the labour market. Rather than breaking down the rigidity of dual labour market 
structure, labour market flexibilization led to a reduced number of regular full-time jobs and opened 
up the non-regular employment sector into which women are drawn.  
Notwithstanding the adverse effects of post-economic crisis labour market restructuring on 
women, Kim and Voos (2007) note that the outflow of younger women and women in pink-collar 
jobs post-1997 has been offset by the simultaneous inflow of older and married women into the 
labour market (often in the low wage and non-regular employment sector). For example, the number 
of employed women in their 20s declined from 2.215 million in 2001 to 2.128 million in 2006, 
while that of women in their 40s and 50s increased from 3,423 million to 4,117 million (Ministry of 
Labour, 2007).37 The KNSO survey shows that nearly 74 percent of women non-regular wage 
workers in 2006 were married.  
The change in employment patterns of women mirrors the more profound change noted 
above, namely the shift from manufacturing to service sector industry since the 1990s. The number 
of people working in service sector industries increased from 10.7 million in 1991 to 16.4 million in 
2004, whereas the number working in mining and manufacturing industries declined from 5.2 
million to 4.3 million.  
Non-standard employment is precarious because of lack of employment security, limited 
(though increasing) social insurance coverage, and low wage. The OECD data suggest that the wage 
gap between temporary and regular workers in Korea is about 30 percent, in the middle range of 
                                          
36 Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) has begun a project called “Social Services Industries 
Welfare” in 2006 in response to the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Labour’s concerns about high 
unemployment rate. The project analyzes the impacts of social service expansion in reducing unemployment and 
increasing women’s employment rate (interviews with Se-Kyung Park and Hyekyu Kong, KIHASA, 17 December 2007. 
Also, interview with Joo-Hyun Park, Secretary General, and Chairman of Operating Committee, Presidential Committee 
on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 17 December 2007. 
37 This could be because more young women opt for higher education. The Ministry of Education’s data show a sharp 
increase in the number of female students registered in higher educational institutions after 1997. Between 1996 and 
1997, the number rose from 940,175 to 1,049,907. In 2005, 1,399,931 female students were registered in higher 
educational institutions (MOEHRD, 2005).   
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OECD European countries (Grubb, Lee and Tergeist, 2007).38 In addition to wage disparity, there 
are noticeable differences in the non-wage welfare benefits between regular and non-regular 
workers and between workers in large and small-medium companies. Since most non-standard 
workers are found in small and medium size firms, and since most women who are non-standard 
workers work in smaller establishments, their access to welfare benefits is limited. Given the low 
wages and poor working conditions, the expansion of employment opportunities for women outside 
the household remains a poor substitute for the employment security afforded to male breadwinners 
under the old system. 
 In sum, while the recent social policy reforms promise to alleviate the family’s care burden 
through the extension of social care and social welfare, this may not necessarily mean a reduction in 
the total amount of work assumed by the family, in particular, women. On the contrary, the 
increased expectation that women (particularly married women) will work suggests that the 
expansion of the state and market sectors in the care diamond may, in fact, mask a substitution 
effect within the family as women’s uncommodified care work within the household is being 
supplemented by their commodified (care) labour in the labour market. This raises two important 
questions: first, to what extent will the replacement of women’s uncommodified labour within the 
family with commodified labour in the market translate to gender equality; and second, to what 
extent will the expansion of the state and market provisions of care and other social services reduce 
the total amount of work assumed by women within the household and in the labour market?  
As to the first question, the continuing peripheralization of women in Korea’s dual labour 
market suggests that increased commodification of women’s labour is unlikely to lead to women’s 
full financial autonomy and economic independence from the family, particularly if they are married 
and/or have children. On the second question, even though it is premature to make conclusions 
about the impacts of policy changes on gender differences, our analysis gives us little confidence 
that the distribution of unpaid care work between men and women within the household will change 
in the near future. Given that the state and market will never be able to provide all the care work, it 
is quite possible that women will continue to take on a larger total work burden than men. 
 
Changing Dimensions of the Care Diamond: Community: New Expectations 
                                          
38 In Korea, the wage differential between regular and non-regular workers is complicated by the wage differential 
between companies based on company size and union membership. While non-regular workers are generally paid lower 
wages than regular workers, some regular workers in small and medium size firms may be paid lower wages than some 
non-regular workers in large companies. Similarly, while unionized non-regular workers may be paid lower wages than 
unionized regular workers, their wages are higher than non-unionized non-regular workers. 
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In the context of the new care diamond, the community sector is charged with a much greater role in 
organizing and providing social welfare and care. This change has come about as a result of the 
combination of increased state expectation of community participation in social development, and 
the progressive decentralization of social welfare and social care programmes since 2003.  
For one thing, the state has begun to focus on the community as a new site of social 
development, as evidenced by the national development plan, Vision 2030. Based on the idea of 
intersecting circles of economic growth and social welfare development, Vision 2030 emphasizes 
the positive contribution of welfare to the country’s social and economic development. This concept 
emerged from a process of policy rethinking within the Roh Moo-hyun government shortly after it 
took over. Faced with high unemployment, low economic growth, low fertility, rapid population 
ageing, and increased global economic competition, the government was forced to recast the 
“productive welfare policy” paradigm it inherited from the Kim Dae-jung administration which 
focused on labour market restructuring and broadening and consolidating the existing social 
insurance system.  
Two streams of thinking merged in the process of the policy rethink: a revised version of the 
productive welfare and the idea of social capital. In regards to the first, many economists argued that 
the productive welfare policy under the Kim Dae-jung administration was “inconsistent” and “old-
fashioned” (Cho, 2005: 84). The government was urged by policy bureaucrats from economic 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Planning and Budget (formally, the Economic Planning Board 
and the Ministry of Finance), Ministry of Labour, and Korean Development Institute, to adopt a 
more “market-friendly productive welfare policy.” Their views were supported by international 
organizations; for example, the OECD recommended further governance and financial reforms, 
along with income and social service support to new labour market entrants, such as women, youths, 
and workers with dependent children. Policy recommendations from this group of like-minded 
economic policy experts included the following: a focus on job creation, particularly targeting the 
“knowledge-based economy” (i.e. service sector and skilled workers); further expansion and 
refining of social safety nets, for example, by extending social insurance coverage to non-regular 
workers and creating more work incentives within the NBLS system; more labour market flexibility; 
and increased support for human capital development through education and training (Cho, 2005; 
Sul, et. al., 2006).  
The second perspective came from those concerned with the decline of social cohesion and 
social capital in Korea. The growing income inequality and social exclusion post-1997 emerged as a 
major policy issue, so much so that the President created the Presidential Committee on Ageing 
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Society and Population Policy in 2004, and the Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion in 2005. 
These committees were charged with developing and coordinating social policies across different 
ministries to deal with issues of fertility decline, population ageing, and social inequality. The 
Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion was also charged with two huge and contentious tasks – 
reducing poverty and reducing discrimination, both of which involved multi-sector policy 
cooperation and the application of multiple policy levers in areas like social welfare, labour market 
and employment, family, and gender equality, and required significant community participation.39   
Studies had found that civil society organizations in Korea, while extremely effective in 
utilizing a “nationwide solidarity” strategy to push for policy change, failed to bring about 
environmental and socio-cultural improvements in level of social trust and civic participation (Joo, 
Lee and Jo, 2006). International comparative studies of social capital showed that the level of social 
trust amongst Korean people was extremely low and highly particularized. Korean people’s trust in 
public institutions, such as national associations, government institutions, the judiciary, and 
educational institutions, had declined since 1981. The level of civic participation in volunteer 
activities was low compared to other OECD countries and had continued to fall. In short, social trust 
in Korea was at one of the lowest levels in the OECD (Kim, 2006; Joo, Lee and Jo, 2006). Like 
Japan, the issue of social cohesion has a particular resonance in Korea because of the post-World 
War II national narrative of Korea as a homogeneous and relatively equal and cohesive society. The 
findings and the idea of Korea’s declining social cohesion thus fell on receptive policy ears within 
the government, and prompted calls for policy interventions to resuscitate the deteriorating state of 
social capital. These included governance reforms, increased public investments to promote public 
participation in civic associations, more support for NGOs, and investment in communications and 
community infrastructures that would facilitate civic engagement.  
Vision 2030 came out of the Ministry of Planning and Budget, which while dominated by 
economic bureaucrats, featured an interministerial group in the policymaking process. It therefore 
required some degree of consensus amongst different ministries, including Ministries of Health and 
Welfare, and Gender Equality and Family, which did not share the views on social policies held by 
the Ministry of Planning and Budgets. Vision 2030 thus incorporated two sets of ideas – the new 
version of productive welfare and social capital investment. Despite their apparently widely 
divergent policy ideas, the ministries’ views converged on a common point: the need for increased 
local and community role in social development. As Hyekyung Lee, Chairperson of the Presidential 
                                          
39 The Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion was institutionalized into Ministry of Planning and Budget in 2006. 
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Committee on Social Inclusion, notes, the future direction of social services in Korea cannot be 
accomplished by simply raising social spending; it requires the increased participation of civil 
society. Pointing to Korea’s history of dependence on overseas assistance since 1945, which led to 
the prohibition of non-government supported charity work, and the undermining of the domestic 
charity and voluntary sector during the authoritarian period, Lee argues that social integration can 
be achieved through civil society engagement in social services (Lee, 2007). Social investment 
therefore must take into account social development at community level.  
Whereas Lee and other social policy advocates see civil society engagement in social 
welfare as an important mechanism for promoting civic participation and social integration, many 
economic bureaucrats see it in the light of economic productivity and efficiency. As one of the 
Vision’s main institutional sponsors, Korean Development Institute, points out: 
Vision 2030 stresses overall economic productivity. Its strategies include transforming the 
economic structure to improve service sector productivity, the future source of wealth; 
investing in research and development for technological innovations; investing in human 
capital to enhance labor productivity; investing in social welfare to guarantee stable 
livelihood as a way to heighten labor productivity; and boosting economic efficiency 
through proactive globalization. (Suh, Jung-hae, 2007) 
 
In either case, social capital emerged as a base for the national development strategy. As Kim (2006) 
concludes, social capital and national development are implicitly linked because a prosperous and 
decent society necessarily requires “nurturing new engines of growth, development in human capital, 
expansion of social safety nets, investing in social capital and active globalization.”  
 Along with the policy focus on social capital development, the decentralization of social 
welfare and services from the national to local/community level has enhanced the role of local 
governments and the community in provision of social welfare and care. Since 2005, the Roh Moo-
hyun government has been progressively downloading central government responsibilities onto 
local and regional governments through legislative reforms and fiscal transfers. A good example of 
this is the ECCE policy. As the central government increases its financial support to local 
governments,40 local governments are expected to provide more ECCE spaces and centres for 
children. At the same time, the local government is mandated to expand their ECCE programmes, 
                                          
40 The central government increased its financial support for ECCE by raising its total funding contribution from 29.8 
percent of total national ECCE funding in 2002, to 33.6 percent in 2006 (Korea Institute of Child Care and Education, 
2008). 
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and to improve childcare and early childhood education system by implementing new accreditation 
and evaluation systems for childcare centres and kindergartens (Rhee, 2007).41 Community and 
businesses are encouraged to participate in the emergent social service market, including childcare; 
local entrepreneurs, parents, and businesses are encouraged to provide childcare services through 
legal mandates, financial incentives, and support for creation of social enterprises.42 More 
specifically, the Second Scheme of National Childcare Support Policy (Saeromaji 2010), 
established by the Presidential Committee on the Ageing and Future Society in 2006, has, in 
addition to introducing childcare subsidies for parents, imposed a new requirement on companies 
with more than 300 female employees or more than 500 employees, regardless of the gender 
composition of the employees, to provide childcare facilities in the workplace, thus raising the 
number of companies mandated to provide workplace childcare from 278 in 2005 to 824 in 2006. In 
exchange for providing workplace childcare, employers are given financial support to set up 
childcare spaces within workplace.  
The local and community responses to childcare expansion have been so far mixed. While 
some local governments are refusing to invest in social welfare and social care infrastructure 
because of the large capital commitment,43 the number of home day care centres, private home-
based childcare services that cater for 5 to 20 children, has increased rapidly. There is a concomitant 
emergence of parent co-op day care centres, a totally new kind of childcare institution. In the home 
day care situation, women often use their homes to provide care for children in the local community, 
and receive financial support from the Ministry of Health and Welfare pro-rated to the number of 
children in their care. Between 2002 and 2007, the number of home day care centres increased from 
7,939 to 12,360. Sixty-two parent childcare co-ops have been created since 2004 (Korea Institute of 
Child Care and Education, 2008). Given the projection of a steady increase in the number of 
children enrolled in childcare over the next decades, and given the continuing increase in the 
government funding of ECCE, we anticipate a parallel increase in the number of community based 
childcare providers.  
In sum, although slow to react, the community sector is beginning to expand its role within 
the care diamond in Korea. Given the recent push on the community to take on a larger social 
welfare role, we may see a positive increase in the community’s role in social care. 
                                          
41  The Roh Moo-hyun government has offered fiscal support to local governments to take on other social welfare 
services, such as welfare institutions, job training centres, and elderly care. 
42  Social enterprise is defined as “a social purpose enterprise, using business tools and techniques to achieve explicitly 
social aims, that has many characteristics that are similar to an SME” (Noh, 2005).  
43 Interview with Hyekyung Lee, Chairperson, Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion, 18 December 2008. 
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The government’s expectation of an increased community role in social welfare and social 
care is a part of a productive welfare policy strategy introduced by the Kim Dae-Jung administration, 
elaborated upon and enlarged by the Roh Moo-hyun regime.  
During the Kim Dae-Jung government, self-reliance programmes – job creation programmes 
for able bodied public assistance recipients – were introduced within the National Basic Livelihood 
Support (NBLS) by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. At the time, the self-reliance programme 
was regarded as a welfare-to-work programme targeted to a small group of NBLS recipients. These 
job creation programmes were often run by social enterprises – hybrid businesses that had 
characteristics of both non-profit organizations and for-profit enterprises, often created through 
public-private partnerships. These social enterprises often received financial support for capital and 
operating expenses from the government, as well as tax reduction and support for social insurance 
premiums. In return, they functioned as job creation centres, providing jobs and training for the 
unemployed.  
In light of high unemployment and the low rate of job-increase, President Roh Moo-hyun 
pledged in his 2006 New Year’s announcement to create more jobs, primarily through the expansion 
of the social service sector, to deal with social polarization. This set the stage for the subsequent 
government effort to develop a social enterprise based job creation scheme. The President’s pledge 
for job creation was reiterated by a 2007 government pledge to create 800,000 jobs in the social 
service sector, and was followed by the Social Enterprise Promotion Law in the same year. The 
Social Enterprise Promotion Law formalized state support for social enterprises and opened the door 
for businesses to apply for certification as a social enterprise (Korea Foundation for Working 
Together, 2008). Even before the enforcement of the Social Enterprise Promotion Law, however, 
the Ministry of Labour initiated a project to create social service jobs by providing grants to NGOs 
in 2003. This project, which began as the Ministry of Labour’s social service job creation project 
with an annual budget of 7.3 billion Won in 2003, had evolved into a multi-ministerial collaboration 
involving 11 government ministries with a total budget of approximately 1.3 trillion Won by 2007 
(Ministry of Labour, 2008). The role of the community and NGOs in providing social services and 
care is underscored by the Ministry of Labour’s rationale for supporting social service job creation: 
Creating social service jobs has boosted our economy’s growth potential as it ahs helped 
the not economically active population, including housewives and the aged, to be brought 
into the economically active population. In particular, providing social services, such as 
child caring, housekeeping and patient caring, have liberated women from domestic work, 
which in turn, has increased employment. The project to create social service jobs has not 
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only created jobs for vulnerable groups of workers, …(but) has also played the role of 
providing social services which are in short supply, thereby largely contributing to 
supplying social services for low-income lower middle classes who want to get such 
services but have little purchasing power. The project has a great significance in that it has 
opened up new horizons by creating jobs in the social service sector, which is often called 
the third sector beyond the private and public sectors and need to expand its share of 
employment, through cooperation between NGOs and the government. (Ministry of Labour, 
2008, http://english.molab.go.kr/english/Employment/print.jsp, accessed 17 June 2008) 
 
Multiple Actors and Conflicting Objectives: Case of Childcare Policy  
While it is clear that the care mix in Korea has become more complex as a result of the increased 
state role in regulating, financing, and directly providing social welfare and care, and as a result of 
simultaneous changes in the market, family, and community sectors, the dynamics of the changes 
have not always been either coherent or self-evident. Indeed, a closer examination of the political 
economic dynamics of social policy reforms shows that these changes have resulted from active 
policy contestations amongst multiple actors with often conflicting objectives. In this section I 
examine the political economic processes involved in recent childcare policy reform to illustrate the 
complexity of the social policy reform process. I choose childcare policy reform, first, because it is 
central to the Roh Moo-hyun government’s family-work harmonization policy and an excellent 
example of the recasting of the earlier productive welfare policy paradigm of the Kim Dae-jung 
administration; and second, because as a policy sector, it is small enough to allow in-depth 
examination.   
Childcare policy reform is central to the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s Vision 2030 Plan 
cited above. It addresses key policy issues – high unemployment, low economic growth, low 
fertility, rapid population ageing, and increasing globalization – and it embodies the principle of 
social and economic development through social and human capital investment. Simply put, the 
childcare policy reform serves as an excellent barometer of policy change during the five years of 
the Roh Moo-hyun administration.  
The Roh Moo-hyun government came into power in 2003 with much public expectation and 
facing a large political challenge. In defiance of the conservative Grand National Party’s attempt to 
make a comeback at the end of the Kim Dae-Jung’s term, Korean voters opted for another outsider, 
Roh Moo-hyun, who promised to improve the governance structure and deepen civil society 
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participation in political and policy processes – what he called “participatory democracy.”44 The 
transition to the Roh Moo-hyun administration was far from smooth. After the euphoria of post-
crisis economic recovery (1999 to 2002), the country woke up to the reality of the end of rapid 
economic growth. The economic growth rate dropped to 3.1 percent in 2003, the lowest since 1998, 
and remained low at around 4 percent for the next five years. The public frustration at the apparent 
lack of improvement in economic condition was compounded by growing awareness of economic 
inequality and poverty despite the welfare state expansion. Earlier public support for the 
government’s pro-welfare policies was gradually replaced by criticism of the government’s inability 
to manage economic recovery. Media attention shifted to the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s lack 
of understanding about economy and political diplomacy. Public support for the President declined 
as public anxiety over high unemployment and low economic growth grew. The Roh Moo-hyun 
administration was thus faced with a need to move beyond the Kim Dae-jung model of productive 
welfare policy. In an attempt to develop more coordinated and specific policies to address the issues 
of economy and social inequality, the President ordered the Presidential Committee on Social 
Inclusion to mediate interministerial dialogue and develop a new national agenda to reduce poverty 
and discrimination. One of the Committee’s first issues was childcare policy reform.45  
Childcare proved to be an attractive social policy agenda because it addressed a number of 
important policy concerns shared by the interministerial group members, including low fertility, 
population ageing, gender equality, job creation, and support for service sector industry. More to the 
point, if carried out well, child care policy reform could satisfy the public demand for economic 
growth and social welfare. While all the members in the interministerial group agreed on the 
expansion of childcare, opinions on how to achieve it differed widely. Ministry of Gender Equality 
and Family supported a proposal to introduce universal public childcare made by Korean Women’s 
Development Institute (KWDI), the policy research think-tank affiliated to the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family, and Ministry of Health and Welfare.46 The KWDI’s research had found 
significant public dissatisfaction with the existing childcare policy. Most mothers they surveyed felt 
that government childcare subsidies were too low, and there were not enough public childcare 
centres, the favourite choice of all mothers. The KWDI’s care paradigm was also informed by social 
democratic exemplars like Sweden and Denmark. Their idea of a family care regime thus implied 
                                          
44 This concept of embedding civil society into policy processes became part of the regime’s “participatory welfare.” 
45 At the same time, other committees, such as the Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 
were engaged in childcare policy discussions.  
46 Interview with Seung-Ah Hong, Fellow, Family Policy Research Centre, Korean Women’s Development Institute, 14 
December 2007. 
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socialization of care, through publicly provided childcare. They argued that it would be more cost-
effective for the government to provide public childcare services rather than using subsidies because 
of the low transactional cost – the infrastructure for such services already existed.47 
The KWDI, MOGEF and MOHW held numerous meetings over childcare strategy but failed 
to come up with a unified position on the issue of subsidies versus public provision of childcare. 
While MOGEF was supportive of universal public childcare, its most logical policy ally within the 
government bureaucracy, MOHW, was divided. Within the interministerial group, a huge difference 
also existed between the “economic ministries” such as Ministry of Planning and Budget and 
Ministry of Labour, on the one side, and the “social ministries” of MOGEF and MOHW on the 
other. The Ministry of Planning and Budget was proposing a total deregulation of childcare, 
preferring the state to use subsidies and tax benefits as incentives to stimulate market demands and 
to increase market competition; they argued that individual needs for childcare services could be 
most efficiently met by the market. While not entirely convinced of the merit of public provision of 
childcare services, MOHW was not comfortable with the Ministry of Planning and Budget’s idea of 
total deregulation, worried that the quality of care might be sacrificed. The Ministry of Labour, 
meanwhile, saw the burgeoning childcare market as an excellent opportunity to advance its interests 
in job creation and employment facilitation for women.  
The debate on childcare policy reform also raged outside the interministerial group as well. 
Most NGOs and researchers supported the idea of publicly provided childcare services, and surveys 
showed that most mothers preferred public childcare system. However, nearly 95 percent of the 
childcare providers were private sector; thus, the Private Childcare Providers’ Association presented 
the largest opposition to KWDI’s universal public childcare proposal. Pointing to the lack of 
efficiency and flexibility in the public childcare system, they put the full force of stakeholder 
pressure to bear on the government, asking it to not make childcare services public. The Korean 
Childcare Teachers’ Association (KCTA), the majority of whose membership worked in private 
sector childcare centres, was divided on the issue. In their view, the universal public childcare 
policy presented both opportunities and constraints. Making childcare centres public would imply 
formalization of their employment status as public service workers, which came with employment 
security, union representation, and higher wage and better working conditions; but it would most 
likely entail stricter certification requirements. In the end the KCTA accepted the position of private 
provision of childcare.  
                                          
47  Interview with Seung-Ah Hong, 14 December 2007. Hong was also involved in the KWDI research on childcare as a 
researcher during childcare policy reform in 2005 and 2006.  
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The interministerial processes over childcare policy reform took about a year and a half. 
During this time, the committee’s policy proposal was given to the Vice Ministers of all the relevant 
ministries, discussed within each ministry, and debated within the committee before an agreement 
was reached and presented to the President. The President then organized an all-ministers committee 
meeting, inviting academics and policy experts in the childcare sector, along with members of civil 
society, to discuss the plan.  
Childcare policy had received much political and policy attention at this point because the 
total fertility rate in Korea had dropped to 1.08 in 2005, a historic low, and there was collective 
anxiety about the future of the Korean population.48 The government faced increasing social and 
political problems – not just a slowing economy and high unemployment, but also income 
inequality, alleged government corruption, and the lowest-ever fertility. The proposal for universal 
public childcare became increasingly less convincing in the face of priority policy demands such as 
job creation and fiscal control. Ministry of Health and Welfare lost some of its earlier vested 
interests in childcare when much of the family and childcare portfolio was shifted to the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family in 2005. Further, the MOHW by this time had shifted much of its 
attention to pension reform and the Elderly Care Insurance proposal, fiscally much larger sectors 
than childcare. MOHW thus agreed with Ministry of Planning and Budget’s position to stay on the 
existing policy course, increasing childcare subsidies rather than pushing for universal public 
childcare. In the end, the reform resulted in a significant fiscal commitment to childcare through 
subsidies to parents and to businesses to establish workplace childcare, while leaving intact the 
structure of private sector dominated provision.  
Childcare policy reform in Korea expanded through the financial broadening of subsidies to 
parents, and concerted multiple sector efforts to develop the childcare market. The process was far 
from harmonious; it involved over a year and a half of contentious political debate within and 
outside the government as multiple actors struggled to push forward diverse policy agendas.  
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper has examined the political and social economy of care in Korea since the 1990s. Changes 
in the configuration of the care diamond suggest a marked increase in state, market, and community 
roles in care as a result of labour market restructuring and social policy reforms. The increased 
public support for care in Korea, however, should not be interpreted as simply an expression of the 
                                          
48 Interview with Joo-Hyun Park, Secretary General, and Chairman of Operating Committee, Presidential Committee on 
Ageing Society and Population Policy, 17 December 2007. 
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state’s intention to relieve women of family care obligations. A more careful analysis suggests a 
combination of both progressive and pragmatic economic motivations behind the social policy 
reforms. Simply put, social care reforms since the 1990s, especially those introduced after 1997, 
have responded to feminist and pro-welfare advocate demands for welfare expansion and greater 
gender equality, as well as to economic developmentalist demands for an active labour market 
strategy. In the latter case, the government made social investments, seeking to mobilize women’s 
human capital and labour power in the context of a rapidly ageing population and growing labour 
shortages. For many feminists who supported the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments, 
the expansion of social care was part of a larger and more complex set of policies necessary to 
achieve gender equality. Their demands for gender equality and social welfare expansion were 
supported by parallel policy changes in the area of family-work harmonization policies, such as 
parental leave legislation, childcare and elderly care, and increased support for lone parent families. 
At the same time, these progressive changes were complicated by neoliberal labour market reforms, 
including the deregulation of protective employment legislations that pushed a large proportion of 
women and men workers into non-standard and precarious employment. From the state’s point of 
view, however, commodifying the un-commodified care work was important in achieving two 
objectives: freeing women to enter the labour market to participate in other commodified labour and 
creating new economic growth engines through the socialization of child and elderly care. 
This study of the commodification of care work in Korea raises three important issues. First, 
it underscores the importance of the state’s social policy role in determining and defining the nature 
of women’s work. Without the child and elderly care policy reforms and the reforms in cognate 
areas such as family support, employment legislations related to maternity and parental leaves, work 
hours, and temporary employment, the bulk of family care work would remain as un-commodified 
labour within the household. Social policy reforms thus provided institutional and legal conditions 
to externalize women’s care work and facilitate commodification of their labour through 
participation in the labour market. However, by providing institutional and legal basis for families to 
externalize care, the policy reforms have created and affirmed a new normative ground for women 
to commodify labour. It is important therefore not to read the commodification of women’s unpaid 
care work as the reduction of women’s work. Rather, as the case of Korea shows, it implies a shift 
in the location and financial accounting (however imperfect) of women’s work.  
Second, as shown in this paper, in Korea, the commodification of women’s labour is very 
much a response to, and understood as, an effective way for the state to address a number of socio-
economic issues, including helping families deal with poverty and labour market insecurities, 
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dealing with low fertility (a means to encourage childbirth), and more effectively allocating human 
resources in a rapidly ageing society (providing a more effective system of elderly care).  
Third, it raises the question of the significance of commodification of women’s labour for 
gender equality – can it lead to reduced reliance on marriage/kin/family and enhanced power? Can 
the economy generate sufficient decently paid and protected employment, so that women can easily 
commodify their labour? So far, the evidence suggests that the commodification of women’s labour 
in Korea has been happening in the absence of improvements in employment conditions. Indeed, 
recent labour market restructuring has resulted in increased employment insecurity and a worsening 
of employment conditions, a situation that suggests that commodification of their labour may cause 
more harm than good for women. 
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Table 1. Composition of all households with older people (65 +), 1990-2000 
           
       Age-groups in 2000 (years)  
Household composition  1990 2000 65-69 70-79 80+    
          Percentages   
One generation  16.9 28.7 35.5 27.5 12.8 
Two generations  23.4 23.9 27.3 19.9 26.5 
Three generations 49.6 30.8 23.2 33.3 45.1 
Single person    8.9 16.2 13.7 18.9 15.0 
Total               100.0     100.0     100.0      100.0     100.0 
          
Source: National Statistical Office (2004), quoted in Choi (2006) 
  
 
Table 2. Changes in the relation between family and old-age support 
           
 
                                            Live with children children provide material support 
 Year    Yes  No  Yes  No  
       Percentage 
 1994  n.a.  n.a.  62.1  37.6 
 1998  54.5  44.9  58.2  41.6 
 2002  42.7  56.7  53.3  46.3 
           
Source: National Statistical Office (2004), quoted in Choi (2006) 
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Figure 1: The Social Security System in South Korea 
 
 
Social Security System 
Social Insurance 
 
• Health Insurance 
• Pension Insurance 
• Unemployment 
Insurance 
• Workers Compensation 
Public Assistance 
 
• National Basic 
Livelihood Support 
• Medical Aid 
Social Welfare 
 
• Welfare for the Aged 
• Welfare for the 
Disabled 
• Child Welfare 
• Welfare for Women 
• Medical or Psychiatric 
Social Work 
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Table 4: Summary of Korean Social Policy Regime 
 Expenditure in 








Costs, and Financing 

























1988 – Expansion of health 
insurance and health assistance 
program to workers in work 
place with 5+ employees, and 
self-employed in rural areas. 
 
1988 – Expansion of Industrial 
Accident Insurance. 
 
1989 – Extension of health 
insurance and health assistance 
program to urban self-
employed. (universalization of 
health insurance) 
 
1999 – Unification of 
National health insurance – 
unification of separate health 
insurance carriers under a 
single body, Health Insurance 
Review Agency. 
 
National Health Insurance 
System:  
-Diagnosis, pharmaceutical or 
health care materials, surgery, 
other treatments, hospitalization 
and nursing.  
-Childbirth, drugs, and essential 
preventive services.  
-Health Check-ups: When sick 
or injured, the insured and their 
dependents can receive benefits 
including in-patient and out-
patient care, dental services, 
oriental medicines, prescription 
detection of preventable diseases 
and its treatment, the insured and 
the dependents 40 years or over 
are entitled to free health check-
ups every two years.      
-Compensation for co-payment 
exceeding 1.2 million Won in 30 




payroll tax for workers 
(a total of 5.08percent 
(2006) of employee 
salary; shared 50:50 
between employees and 
employers) 
-Compulsory insurance 
contribution to the NHI 
for self-employed based 
on income calculation 
(+National government 
subsidy of 50percent ) 
-NHI revenue sources: 
81percent - premium 
contribution 
12percent - general tax 
4percent - surcharge on 
tobacco 
3percent - other  
 





































1990 – 3,127.0 
billion Won 








2000 – Separation of medical 
service and drug dispensing- 
medical services and drug 
dispensing separated. 
 
2007 – Introduction of 
Elderly Care Insurance - to 
begin in July 2008.  
 
compensation). 
-80percent of the expenses of 
medical appliances, e.g. canes, 
wheel chairs, hearing aids.             
 
Data source: National Health 










Elderly Care Insurance: 
-necessary long-term care for 
people over the age of 65. 
-covers home based and 
institutional care.  
-to begin in July 2008. 
     
-Co-payments: 
In-patient - 10-















premium to be added 
onto the health 
insurance.  


















Estimated to cover 
only about 2percent of 
all the elderly initially. 
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1990 – 1,165.8 
billion Won 
 








1990 – 298.2 
billion Won 
1988 National Pension- first 
legislated in 1973, but not 
implemented till 1988. Cover 
workers in workplace of 10+ 
people. 
 
1989 – Introduction of legal 
retirement payment system. 
 
1992 – National Pension 
extended to workers in 
workplace with 5+ people. 
 
1995 – Inclusion of people in 
rural areas into the National 
Pension. 
 
1997 – Retirement insurance 
introduced. 
 
1998 – Integration of regional 
and company pensions. 
 
1999 – Compulsory 
participation to National 
Pension for all people between 
the ages of 18 and 60 in 





3)Private School teacher pension 
 
Each pension scheme cover: 
• Retirement pension 
• Widows pension 
• Disability pension 
•  
 
There has been a series of 
attempt to broaden the coverage 
of and maintaining the fiscal 
sustainability of the national 
pension scheme by reducing the 
replacement rate from 60percent 
to 50percent of the wages, and 
increasing the contribution rate 
from 9percent to 12.9percent, 
but this was rejected by the 
Parliament in 1007. 
 
Means-tested old age benefit 
will be introduced in 2008 – will 




Number of pension 
insurants (2005):  
Total: 18,347,000 
(80.4percent of all 
employed person 18 










Teachers Pension:  
237,000 
 
Number of pension 
beneficiaries (2001):  
National Pension: 
955,803 (12.3percent 








2003 – 1,596.6 
billion Won 
workplaces with 10+ 
employees. (70percent of 
economically active population 
covered). 
 
1999 – Urban self-employed 
pensions included in the 
National Pension. 
 
2003 – National Pension made 
compulsory to all workers in 
workplace 1+ people.  
 
2003 – Revision of National 
Pension – reorganization of 
national pension and retirement 
pay. 
 
2007 – Revision of National 
Pension  
cover about 60percent of the 
elderly population. The benefit 
will be only about 5percent of 
average wage. 
 
2005 reform allowed employers 
to replace lump sum retirement 
allowance with company 
pension system.  






Source: Ministry of 
Health, Welfare, and 
Family Affairs. Social 
Security System, 








percent of total 
government 
spending: 
1990 – Active Labour 






Active labour market policies 
primarily focused on 
encouraging employers to hire 
the elderly and the disabled, and 
providing employment support 
for the elderly and the disabled 
 










1995 – 38,953 
1998 – 400,000 














2000 – 470.8 
billion Won 
 














1990 – Environment 












1998 – Employment 







2000 – extension of 





Compensations to the victims of 
environment pollution, 
particularly those related to the 




coverage to workers in 
establishments with 30 or more 
workers (in 1996, this 
represented approximately 
35.5percent of all waged and 
salaried workers). 
 
Extension of employment 
insurance coverage to workers in 
establishment with 10 or more 
workers, and then revised again 
down to establishment with 1 or 
more employees in the same 
year. 
 
Extension of employment 
insurance coverage to workers in 











2004 – 0.15percent of 




2004 – ranges from 
0.1percent to 0.5percent 
of wage contributed by 
the employer, 
depending on size of 
the employment. 
# of people covered 
under Employment 
Insurance: 
1995 – 4.204 million 
2004 – 7.577 million 
 
2004 
68.9percent of all EI 
workplace had 5 or 
less employees 
 




28.1percent of all 
insured by EI worked 
in service sector. 
 
36.1percent of all 




EI coverage ratio: 













1990 – 58.6 
billion Won 
 
2000 – 2,440.1 
billion Won 
 
2003 – 1,141.1 
billion Won 
 
2004 – extension of 
Employment Insurance 
 




Extension of employment 
insurance coverage to daily 
workers.  
 
Extension of maternity leave 
period from 60 to 90 days.  
 
2004 – 50.9percent of 
all workers 
 
# of maternity leave 
takers 
2002 – 22,711 
(50percent of all 
eligible women) 
 
2004 – 38,541 
(85percent) 
 
# of parental leave 
takers 
2002 – 3,763 
(16.7percent of 
recipients of maternity 
leave) 
 
2004 – 9,303 
(24percent) 
 
Source: Keum, et.al. 
2005. Employment 
Insurance in Korea: 





























1990 – 562.5 
billion Won 
 
2003 – 3,648.5 

















1998 - IACI reform extension 
 
 
2000 - IACI reform extension 
Extension of IACI to 20 
industries with 5 or more 
employees. 
 
Extension of IACI to mining, 
forestry, fisheries, wholesale and 
retail and real estate industries 
with10 or more employees. 
 
Extension of IACI to the above 
industries with 5 or more 
employees. 
 
Extension of IACI to education 
services, health and social 
welfare services. 
 
Extension of IACI to finance, 
insurance, and dispatch workers. 
 
Extension of IACI to all self-
employed. 
 











1990 – 59.9 
billion Won 
 
2003 – 867.2 







1990 – 335.3 
billion Won 
 
2003 – 3,255.8 
billion Won 
1987 – Expansion of 
educational support for children 
of people receiving public 
assistance and those living in 
subdivisions and designated 
areas to attend secondary and 
vocational high schools. 
 
1991 – Child Care Act – 
establishment of child care 
institutions. 
 
1993 – Employment Support 
Allowance (one time cash 
benefit) to people completing 
job training programs. 
 
1997 – Extension of 
educational support to children 
of all public assistance 
1)Medical Assistant (medical aid 
program) 
- Basic Livelihood security 
recipient    
-Medical care for poor foreign 
workers  : provide subsidies to 
medical institutions that have 
been giving free medical 
treatment to the needy                   
 
 
2)National Basic Livelihood 
Support Program 
- public assistance for 
individuals and households with 
income less than minimum 
income threshold calculated by 














2) general taxation; 
means-tested 
1)medical aid: 
1,420,539 (year end 
eligible person) 










of all public assistance 
recipients up to secondary and 
vocational high schools.  
 
1998 – Introduction of active 
welfare. 
 
2000 – National Basic 
Livelihood Security Act 
established, and implemented 
in 2000. 
 
2005 – National Child Care 
Act - expansion of child care 
institutions, public subsidies for 
child care for families with 
preschool age children, new 
regulatory 
 1) 49.3 billion 
won in 






4) 97.4 billion 
 3)For the aged: free, low-price 
and private facilities. Only 
seniors in the low-income 
bracket are allowed into free or 
low-price facilities.       
 
4)Disabled, supporting plan : 
self-support, education aid, 










3) Only seniors in the 
low-income bracket 
are allowed into free 
or low-price facilities.  
 
 
4) In 2002, 140,000 















medical aid and 
medical 





billion won in 
aid. 
 
budgetary measures such as tax 
deduction and public facilities 
fee discounts.  
Ten-year Plan for Senile 
Dementia)*  : building nursing 
facilities, hospital and research 
institutions for dementia, and 
implementing pilot projects of 
remote-clinics        
The Aged Employment Services 
Centre, the Aged Workplace and 
the Aged Employment 
Promotion: 572 communal 
workplaces .  
Aged Employment Promotion 
Act was enacted, encouraging 
companies to employ 3percent 
or more of its employees from 
the senior population aged 55 or 
more 
 
5)Child and Family - Child 
Welfare Act 
-Employment programs- such as 
technical and vocational 
training, consultation, social 




























119,000 with medical 




institution: 216 and 
Non-residential 747. 
Persons in institution 




















up orphans since 1976 
-institutional care: where the 
government provides financial 
assistance and counselling 
services on psychological, 
educational, and vocational 
training issues. Maternity care 
also offered to unmarried single 
mothers so that they can give 
birth to a baby in a healthy and 


























1982 - Early Childhood 
Education Promotion Act – 
establishment of public and 
private kindergartens. 
 
1992 – Education Law 146, 
147 -  national standardization 
of kindergarten curriculum.  
 
2004 – Early Childhood 
Education Act -  removal of 
ECE from within the Primary 
and Secondary Education Law; 
integrated care and education 
service for 3-5 year olds as 
presented in the 1997 reform.  
1) early childhood education – 
mainly kindergarten education 
for children aged 4 and 5 
 
2) primary education 
 
3) secondary education (middle 
and high school) 
 
4) University 
1) combination of 
public and private 
kindergartens. Public 
kindergarten free, but  
the cost of private 
kindergartens are borne 
by the family, and 
partially subsidized by 
the state. The most 
recent ECCE legislation 
proposes  free early 
childhood education for 
all children 5-years.  
 








enrolment rate for 
middle school;   




enrolment rate for 
university. 
 
Total number of 
 56
 3) free, compulsory for 
middle school, but 
students bear the price 
for high school 
 
4) combination of 
public and private 
universities, but 













Table 5: Time on paid and unpaid care work by sex and marital status 1999, 2004 (percent) 
 
1999 2004  
 MPT PR MPT PR 
SNA work 11 30 11 32 
Housekeeping 1 31 1 30 
Single  
Person care 0.5 5 1 6 
SNA work 29 79 28 78 
Housekeeping 1 38 2 41 
Married  
Person care 1 21 1 24 
SNA work 19 56 17 56 




Person care 1 14 1 14 
SNA work 10 28 11 31 
Housekeeping 2 53 2 48 
Single  
Person care 0.3 8 0.3 7 
SNA work 14 48 13 46 
Housekeeping 16 98 15 98 
Married  
Person care 4 60 5 59 
SNA work 13 45 12 43 




Person care 1 25 1 23 
Note: SNA = System of National Accounts, MPT = mean population time, and PR = participation rate.   




Table 6: Time on child, spouse and parent care by sex and marital status 1999, 2004 (minutes/ 
percent) 
 
Child care Spouse care Parent care 


















Single 1 2 1 1 - - - - 1 1 2 3 
Married 9 15 11 18 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 




6 6 5 8 - - - - 0.3 1 1 1 
Single 2 3 2 3 - - - - 1 3 2 4 





16 16 13 14 - - - - 1 1 1 1 
Note: SNA = System of National Accounts, MPT = mean population time, and PR = participation rate.   
Source (An, Miyoung 2008).  
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Employment related social 
welfare





Private investment in 
education and health
Support economic    
development / growth
Basic social security 
system
Social investment in 
education and health 
Limited role in social 
welfare
Growing civil society 
role in policy advocacy
Limited care provision




Social investment in 
human + social capital













Increased expectation of social 
welfare







Table 7: Estimated percent of Kindergarten and Childcare Centre Enrolment, 2006-2020 
 
Year       Kindergarten enrolment  Childcare center enrollment (unit percent)    
 Age 3 Age 4 Age 5 Age 0 Age 1 Age 2 Age 3 Age 4    Age 5   
2006  16.38  32.66  47.38  10.02  21.24  39.18  47.21  39.82  31.69  
2010  20.02  38.92  48.15  17.65  29.28  45.41  57.94  51.85  38.10  
2015  22.15  38.70  49.58  21.80  35.21  48.70  62.97  56.25  43.92  
2020  22.86  37.10  49.84  24.76  39.59  51.15  65.26  58.60  47.61 
Note: The figures above were estimated using time series techniques with the number of children under  
age 5 and the number of children enrolled in kindergartens childcare centers from 2002 to 2005.  
Source: Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development Korean Educational Development  
Institute (2005, 2006). Statistical Yearbook of Education. 
 
Table 8: Per capita budgets for early childhood education and child care, 2005-2006  
             Unit: thousand Won   
Fiscal Year Budgets for ECE   Budgets for Childcare   
 
 Amount(A)     Number of           Per capita    Amount(A)        Number of             Per capita  
        children enrolled budget           children enrolled       budget 
              (B)                   (A/B)   (B)           (A/B)  
2005 628,585,225     541,350  1,161 1,601,373,952       930,252           1,721  
2006      886,011,000     545,842           1,623      2,038,102,360    1,006,842         2,024  
Sources: Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development Korean Educational Development  
Institute (2005, 2006). Statistical Yearbook of Education; Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (2005,  




Table 9. Financial Support for Child Care, 2007.  
 
1 USD = Approx. 950 Won 
1 EURO = Approx. 1,250 Won 
 




Childcare fee support for low-income  
families on a sliding scale 
    
Childcare fee support 
for 
Families with  
Two or more children 
 
Childcare fee support 
for  










Income level 1 & 2: 361,000 won  
Level 3: 288,800 won 
Level 4: 180,500 won 
Level 5: 72,200 won 
 









Income level 1 & 2: 317,000 won 
Level 3: 253,600 won 
Level 4: 158,500 won 
Level 5: 63,400 won 
 









Income level 1 &2: 262,000 won 
Level 3: 209,600 won 
Level 4: 131,000 won 
Level 5: 36,000 won 
 








Income level 1 &2: 180,000 won 
Level 3: 144,000 won 
Level 4: 90,000 won 
Level 5: 36 ,000 won 
 









Income level 1 & 2: 162,000 won 
Level 3: 129,600 won 
Level 4: 81,000 won 
Level 5: 32,400 won 
 






























Free childcare: 162,000 won 
(for families of income level 1 through 5) 
 
 
100percent of childcare 
fees 
(162,000 won) 
(for families with less 
than 5 ha of land) 
 
Source: Korea Institute of Child Care and Education. 2008. Child Rearing Support Policies in Korea, 2007.  Seoul: 










































Tuition support on a sliding scale 
Tuition support for 
families with two 
or more children 
Tuition support 










Income level 1 &2: up to 180,000 won in 
private K; up to 53,000 won in Ntl/public K 
Level 3: up to 144,000 won in private K 
up to 42,000 won in Ntl/public K 
Level 4: up to 90,000 won in private K 
up to 26,5000 won in Ntl/public K 
Level 5: up to 36,000 won in private K 
Up to 10,600 won in Ntl/public K 
 
Up to 90,000 won 
in private K 
53,000 won in 
National/public K 
 
126,000 won in 
private K 










Income level 1 & 2: up to 162,000 in 
private K; up to 53,000 won in Ntl/public K 
Level 3: up to 129,000 won in private K 
Up to 42,400 won in Ntl/public K 
Level 4: up to 81,000 in private K 
Up to 26,500 won in Ntl/public K 
Level 5: up to 32,400 won in private K 
Up to 10,600 won in Ntl/public K 
 
 
Up to 81,000 won 
in private K 
 




113,000 won in 
private K 
 






Free education: 162,000 won  
Up to 162,000 won in Private K; up to 53,000 won in 
national/public K 
(for families of income levels 1 through 5) 
162,000 won in 
private K 
 
56,000 won in 
Ntl/public K 
(for families 
with less than 
5ha of land) 
 
Up to 361,000 
won in private 
K 
 




Table 11. Share of employment, weekly hours, and hourly earnings by employment status, region, 
and sex. South Korea, 2005.  
 




 M F M F M F 
Urban employment 
Regular employee 40.2percent 25.0percent 59 39 14,570 10,871 
    Small scale 1.5percent 1.4percent 43 31 9,589 7,942 
    Other enterprises 38.7percent 23.6percent 59 47 14,771 11,059 
Temporary employee 15.2percent 28.6percent 33 24 7,140 6,048 
    Small scale 4.7percent 10.2percent 31 21 6,287 5,105 
    Other enterprises 10.4percent 18.4percent 34 25 7,529 6,580 
Daily employee 8.2percent 10.1percent 25 14 6,709 4,332 
    Small scale 3.2percent 5.4percent 22 14 6,403 4,173 
    Other enterprises 5.0percent 4.7percent 23 16 6,908 4,515 
Employer 9.9percent 3.5percent 52 54 n/a n/a 
    Small scale 6.0percent 2.9percent 53 54 n/a n/a 
    Other enterprises 3.9percent 0.6percent 50 52 n/a n/a 
Own-account 16.9percent 12.6percent 50 45 n/a n/a 
Contributing family 0.9percent 9.1percent 44 57 n/a n/a 
Rural employment 
Regular employee 0.9percent 0.8percent 40 32 9,009 7,760 
Temporary employee 0.4percent 0.8percent 25 20 5,507 4,874 
Daily employee 0.3percent 0.8percent 22 13 6,481 3,399 
Employer 0.3percent 0.1percent 57 59 n/a n/a 
Own-account 6.4percent 3.1percent 43 39 n/a n/a 
Contributing family 0.5percent 5.5percent 42 43 n/a n/a 
 
Source: Heintz (draft) Employment, Informality and Poverty: An Empirical Overview of Six Countries with a Focus 
on Gender and Race, UNRISD. 
 
 
  
 
